Ramification | New Delhi may not prevent ‘India Out’ campaigns in Bangladesh but can definitely counter them

In Bangladesh politics, India is at the centre of political narratives. Image: Facebook/ INDIA OUT Campaign In Bangladesh

There has been an “India Out” campaign brewing in Bangladesh, though mostly on social media. It is, however, indicative of the powers vested in ruining a good relationship enjoyed by both countries. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—in her Independence day speech, on March 26, 2024—taking the campaign head-on and defending the longstanding camaraderie between her party, the Awami League, and India—challenged the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) fronting this campaign to burn the sarees of their wives that were bought in India. The campaign started in January but took on a political overtone after the BNP jumped in with the anti-India bandwagon.

Many in Bangladesh have alleged that the campaign was the brainchild of anti-Hasina and now-exiled Bangladeshi doctor Pinaki Bhattacharya. The BNP was lacking a foundation to gain traction against Hasina, and Bhattacharya’s campaign found takers in the BNP fold. In recent times, it has not been uncommon to find countries using India to rouse nationalist sentiments in their own countries.

It was under the same premise that President Muizzu of the Maldives was brought to power against the seemingly pro-India Ibrahim Solih. However, the anti-India campaign in the Maldives created a furore at the outset, only to die down quickly with the realisation that India is a much-needed partner.

In Bangladesh politics, India is at the centre of political narratives. And since Hasina won her fourth term, rattling many who rallied against her re-election, it is not a surprise that the campaign was launched alleging Indian interference in the elections.

Bhattacharya launched #BoycottIndia to his millions of followers on social media and was subsequently joined by Ruhul Kabir Rizvi, BNP’s Joint Secretary General, who dramatically threw away his India-made shawl; however, he did not dare to burn his wife’s India-made sarees. A point captured by Hasina. The youth wing leader of the BNP, Ershad Nabil Khan, also joined the fray alongside the BNP’s youth wing for universities—Voices for Democracy.

It is well known that the divide that is seen today in Bangladesh vis-à-vis India is not a new phenomenon. Anti-liberation forces, primarily Jamaat-e-Islami and other stooges of Pakistan, have always been trying to mask their dubious role played before and during the Liberation War by pursuing an anti-India agenda.

The BNP is a by-product of these anti-liberation forces and has forged close ties with Islamic extremists to pursue this agenda. This has resulted in its close links with the radical sections of Bangladeshi society, such as Jamaat-i-Islami that enjoyed Pakistani patronage and fiercely opposed Bangladeshi liberation.

However, the question today to be addressed in light of the #BoycottIndia campaign is not just one relevant to Bangladesh but to India as well. Needless to say, similarly to the Maldives, Bangladesh need not put itself in a position to jeopardise the robust economic ties it enjoys with India.

Whether it can afford to do so or not is a call Bangladesh must take, but incidentally, even during the tenure of the BNP, Indian exports to Bangladesh increased substantially from $1.06 billion in 2001 to $1.66 billion in 2006.

Even today, textiles take centre stage in the raw materials that are exported to Bangladesh from India, apart from refined petroleum, material for infrastructure, and daily use commodities such as garlic, factors that have added value to Bangladesh’s impressive development trajectory under Sheikh Hasina. But the question that is looming large is not the economic or political fallout of such campaigns, but why such campaigns find ground considering there was a time when Bangladesh and its people found their trust in an India that supported them in their fight for independence. A whole generation of Bangladeshis held India and its people in high regard because the citizens of both countries had shed blood together during the Liberation War. The present government in Bangladesh has gone out of its way to acknowledge India’s contribution to the liberation of Bangladesh so that the new generations know about the close bonds between the two countries. The BNP is unfortunately trying to erode this sentimental attachment, having failed to garner India’s support to dislodge Sheikh Hasina and her government.

As India becomes a global superpower, it is unavoidable that opposition parties, such as those in the Maldives and Bangladesh, will use the anti-India factor to garner support. It’s an old tactic with a new player. India may not be able to prevent the compulsions of opposition politics in the neighbourhood, but it surely can manage it.

For starters, India can ramp up its on-ground public outreach. Even though both countries have made efforts such as launching major programmes coinciding with the birth centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the occasion of 50 years of Bangladesh’s independence, and 50 years of India-Bangladesh bilateral ties, there is clearly scope for more.

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has increased the number of scholarships for Bangladeshi nationals to study in Indian institutions. Bangladesh, on the other hand, has started the Mujib Scholarship for the direct descendants of the Indian soldiers killed or grievously injured in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Student-teacher exchange programmes have also been initiated in both the countries, and much has been said about cultural diplomacy and soft power.

However, the fact is that nationalism is an integral part of the nation-state. Jean Monnet, the French diplomat and the unifying force behind the European Union, saw nationalism as a curse to integration, a prophecy that today we see coming true in the deep political faultlines that are appearing in the EU post-BREXIT.

There is no doubt that soft power initiatives have their place in creating trust and familiarity through cultural diplomacy, but they by themselves are not enough. At the very least, it needs to be targeted at a population that will become leaders in Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries in the near future.

Open dialogues for young leaders, lengthy youth camps with an immersive experience for youth of leadership grade, IIT scholarships, and allowing young civil officers to come to India for MBA programmes in our much-coveted IIMs.

Send Indian youth leadership from other cities apart from Kolkata (Kolkata and Dhaka have a perennial sibling rivalry) to witness the Saraswati puja at the Jagannath hall of Dhaka University.

Indian young leaders should meet with Hindu and Muslim leaders and pay respect to the great temples in Bangladesh. While infrastructural and transport connectivity such as the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and Maitri Setu are core pillars of strong neighbourhood relations, if we are to counter this new trend of making India a scapegoat, it is necessary for us to establish foundations that will bear fruit with the next generation of leaders. India cannot prevent “India Out” campaigns, but New Delhi can certainly counter them.

The writer is an anthropologist and a scholar of the northeast region of India. She is a columnist and author and is presently a Distinguished Fellow at the India Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.